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TE PROBLEM STATED
1WTJHEN Randolph proposed the Virginia plan at the third session of
the Constitutional Convention, it contained what has been cor-
rectly characterized as "the only sound and workable principle by which
the powers of nation and states could be divided:"' . . . "the national
legislature ought to be empowered . . . to legislate in all cases to
which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of
the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legis-
lation."2 This was, as Professor Cushman has pointed out,3 "the state-
ment of a principle and not the description of a method; it declared the
object for which national powers were to be conferred rather than the
precise mechanism by which the delegation was to be made." But one
gathers from the ensuing debates that this broad statement correctly
expressed the basic intention of the convention. Indeed, the final form
of the instructions to the Committee of Detail, which translated this
broad principle of national legislative authority into the concrete enum-
eration of powers embodied in article 1, section 8, of the Constitution,
were, if anything, even more liberal.
Thus it is clear that "the delegated powers of Congress . . . were
not conferred in a miserly spirit nor with a niggardly hand. They were
given to serve the broad purpose of Randolph's original resolution . . .
(and) were merely the concrete embodiment in terms of the political
gAssistant professor of Political Science, University of California at Los Angele.
1. Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation (1934) IS Mnm.
L. Rv. 759.
2. Art. 6 of the Virginia Plan, submitted May 29, 1787. FonrszLnoz or TIM Uz.ror
(1927) 117, 954, 958, 961.
3. I have borrowed rather freely in this paragraph from the lucid language of Culh-
man's article.
4. "The national legislature ought to possess the legislative rights vested in Congre by
the confederation; and moreover, to legislate in all cases for the general interezts of the
Union, and also in those to which the states are separately incompetent, or in which the
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legizla-
tion?' Resolution 6 submitted to the Committee of Detail July 26, 1787. FoanTzo. op
THE UnioN (1927) 466.
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experience of the eighteenth century of the principle that the new na-
tional government was to have the powers necessary to deal with all
truly national problems."5  Of course, the enumeration, and not the
principle, marks the limits of national power; and the delegated powers
do not include a broad and undefined authority to legislate for the na-
tional welfare.6 But the construction of any given delegated power
must be made in the light of the principle underlying the enumeration.
Any other construction devitalizes and stultifies what was intended to
be vital and basic. If one would seek "the spirit of the Constitution"1
he could not do better than to find it, so far as our federal system is
concerned, in this declaration of intention.
By and large the Supreme Court's interpretation of congessional pow-
ers has been in keeping with this principle. McCullochz v. Marylandg
Ex parte Marigold,9 Juilliard v. Greenman,1" and Norman v. B. & 0.
Rr. Co." attest to liberal interpretation of the fiscal power, In re
Rapier 2 to the similar construction of the control over mails. In Mis-
souri v. Holland' the treaty power took on new significance as a possible
basis of police legislation, while Havenstein v. United States, 4 United
States v. Arjona,'5 and Keller v. United States' lent support to expand-
ing use of other features of the power to control international affairs.
In The Belfast 7 a mere grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts in
admiralty cases was held to justify national control over the substan-
tive law in this field. At first it appeared that a similar attitude was
to be followed in the construction of the commerce clause, although it
was generally utilized, to be sure, to strike down state legislation which
was thought to burden commerce'8 rather than to sustain federal regula-
5. Cushman, supra note 1, at 760.
6. Cf. LAwsoN, TaE GENERAL WVrA EA CLAUSE (1926), advancing a construction of art,
I, § 8, ci. 1 which the government has consistently refused to champion, and the rejection
of which, in United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 318 (1936), was a foregone conclusion,
7. The Supreme Court has not hesitated, at times, to strike down legislation which it
considered to be contrary to "the spirit of the Constitution," o)r even to the still more
ethereal "principles of republican government" or "essential nature of free governments."
Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 49, 52 (U. S. 1815); Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 657
(U. S. 1829); Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603, 623 (U. S. 1869); Loan Association v.
Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 663 (U. S. 1875). Should not the same argument be open to those
who would sustain legislation?
8. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819). 9. 9 How. 560 (U. S. 1849).
10. 110 U. S. 421 (1884). 11. 294 U. S. 240 (1935).
12. 143 U. S. 110 (1892). 13. 252 U. S. 416 (1920).
14. 100 U. S. 483 (1880). 15. 120 U. S. 479 (1887).
16. 213 U. S. 138 (1909).
17. 7 Wall. 624 (1869). And see Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U, S. 149
(1920), holding that in certain types of cases the clause not only authorizes, but requires,
national uniformity.
18. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824); Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat,
419 (1827); Wabash etc. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 (1886); Lelsy v. Hardin, 135
U. S. 100 (1890).
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tion. And even here the liberal tradition has given us Champion v.
Ames,'9 Second Employers' Liability Cases,"0 Hipolitc Egg Co. v. United
States,"1 Hoke v. United States2-2 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Mary-
land Ry.,23 and Brooks v. United States.24
But in United States v. E. C. Knight Co."a it became evident that the
commerce power, unless the Supreme Court were to adopt a different
test of its scope, would not suffice to accomplish the purpose set forth in
Randolph's resolution. The conclusion that a combination to gain
"nearly complete control of the manufacture of refined sugar within the
United States" is not such a combination as falls within the regulatory
powers of the nation because it relates to activities which take place
before transportation begins is literalism run riot. Rather, it is not
even literalism; for the slogan, "there is no commerce in manufacturing,"
is not found in the Constitution, but was invented by the Court as a
premise to support its conclusion that a state statute forbidding the
manufacture of intoxicants should be sustained.2 The Knight decision
has not stood, for today it is possible to successfully attack a combina-
tion under the federal anti-trust acts even though it enjoys far less of a
monopoly over manufacturing in its particular field than was enjoyed
by the Sugar Trust.27  Yet before it passed from the picture it pro-
duced an heir in Hammer v. Dagenhart.28
19. 188 U. S. 321 (1903). 20. 223 U. S. 1 (1912).
21. 220 U. S. 45 (1911).
22. 227 U. S. 30S (1913). And see Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1917).
23. 242 U. S. 311 (1917). 24. 267 U. S. 432 (1925).
25. 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
26. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 20 (1SS5): "No distinction is more popular to the
common mind, or more dearly expressed in economic and political literature, than that
between manufactures and commerce. Manufacture is transportation. . . . The buying
and selling and the transportation incidental thereto constitute commerce." The opinion
makes it clear that the Court included production in general in the same category with
manufacturing. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887), had held that a state, to
protect the health, morals, and safety of its citizens, may forbid the manufacture or sale
of intoxicants. But in the Kidd case counsel argued that his Iowa client only proposd to
sell its product in other states, and hence that the Iowa law had no relation to the welfare
of Iowans and was an interference with interstate commerce. Instead of establishing a
basis for Iowa jurisdiction in the fact that liquor, although ostensibly made for the foreign
market, can be relied upon to find its way into the domestic market as well, the Court
reversed the syllogism and held that the nation cannot forbid such activities, therefore
the state can. The difficulty with this reasoning is that it fails to establish which state.
The Court also assumed that it was necessa--y to disprove national jurisdiction in order
to sustain state power, a dogma exploded long ago. See Bikl , The Silence of Congrecs
(1927) 41 HARv. L. REv. 200; Grant, The Nature and Scope of Concurrent Power (1934)
34 CoL. L. REv. 995. But it was not the first time that a basic principle was erected upon
a false premise.
27. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1911); United States
v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693 (1927).
28. 247 U. S. 277 (1918).
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The majority opinion in the Child Labor Case did yeoman work in
distinguishing the previous decisions of the Court which had sustained the
use of the commerce power to accomplish police power ends. Whether
we are concerned with the interstate transportation of lottery tickets,
of impure or adulterated food or drugs, of a woman for accomplishment
of an immoral purpose, or of intoxicating liquors," does not the evil
follow transportation? Hence, in each of these instances, is not "the use
of interstate transportation . . . necessary to the accomplishment of
harmful results?" Is it not equally clear that in the case of the products
of child labor the evil-for the exploitation of children is conceded to
be such-is accomplished "before transportation begins," the goods
shipped being "of themselves harmless" alike during and after trans-
portation? Is it not clear, then, that in forbidding their transportation
Congress is regulating production rather than commerce, and thus in-
vading the police power of the states? This reasoning did not seem con-
vincing to four members of the Court, nor does it seem so to the writer.
Is the power of Congress to'prevent gambling, fraud, prostitution, or
intoxication any greater, per se, than its authority to prohibit the ex-
ploitation of labor? Was it not equally true that in attempting to do so
it was invading the realm of the police power? Was not "interstate
transportation," to use the phrase of the majority, "necessary to the ac-
complishment of harmful results" in the latter case equally with the
former? Does' not the evil-the demoralization of the labor standards
of competing states-follow as directly in the one case as in the other?
The line between evils which follow and those which precede trans-
portation is, then, a pure invention of the judicial mind. Would it not be
more logical, if only one is to serve as the basis of national legislation, to
reverse the choice? Cannot the people of a state, through their own gov-
ernment, protect themselves against the evils of gambling and prostitu-
tion? Can they not forbid the use of intoxicants, or the sale of im-
pure, adulterated, or misbranded foods? No doubt they can do these
things more easily with national assistance, and to that extent the fed-
eral laws are beneficial; but they are scarcely indispensable, any more
than national uniformity. Can the same be said of child labor? Did
not the majority, in concentrating its attention upon the finished product
and upon the state of manufacture, ignore the very factor upon which it
purported to rest its conclusion: that ours is a federal system, with no
tariff walls between states?30 The "freedom of state action" which it
preserved is not a freedom to govern, but a freedom to compete by stoop-
29. See cases cited in notes 19, 21-23, supra.
30. "If there were no Constitution and no Congress this power to cros the lino would
depend upon their neighbors. Under the Constitution such commerce belongs not to the
States but to Congress to regulate." Holmes, J., dissenting in Hammer v. Dagenhatt, 247
.1U. S. 277, 281 (1918).
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ing to the same standards as the least ethical competitor. It is free-
dom to fight fire with fire-to the ultimate destruction of much that is
dear to many of us-rather than freedom to provide a fire fighting
agency.31 Certainly of the two constructions it is the one which least
readily fits the test, "To legislate in all cases to which the separate
states are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States
may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation."
Had the Court adopted, on the other hand, the view of Mr. Justice
Holmes, which asked but two questions: 32 Is there an evil, Does the
transportation encourage the evil, the way would have been open
for national legislation in keeping with the changing needs of a dynamic
civilization. Instead it raised a complete barrier to even considering these
questions by decreeing that, regardless of the effect upon other states,
"the making of goods and the mining of coal are not commerce." 33
The demand for national regulation did not stop with this decision.
Consequently it was inevitable that Congress would not cease its efforts
to regulate those aspects of production which it considers of pressing in-
31. The decision has been defended upon the ground that inability to overrule it by
constitutiona amendment proves that it has met with the approval of the American
public. This argument overlooks several important factors. Those who have the Supreme
Court on their side (even though, as here, by a bare majority) have a decided technical
advantage. They need control but one house in each of 13 state legislatures, whereas the
opposition must secure a two-thirds vote in each house of Congress and a majority in each
house of 36 state legislatures, or 74 in all. The Court's decision also tends to caue a
shift in public sentiment. Witness the statement, "This action of Congres (proposing the
Child Labor Amendment) manifests the present unprecedented disrespact for constitu-
ted authority. The time was when the warning words of the Supreme Court . . . had
some effect upon Congress.' (1927) 60 Am. L. REv. 254, 258. This statement implies a
shyster tactic of the lowest sort, but none the less clever. Yet 24 states, containing 52 per
cent of the total population of the 48, have ratified the proposed amendment. Also, the
public reaction to the Child Labor provisions of the N.RA. Codes would lead one to believe
that the great mass of the population would heartily approve of a national law if some
way could be devised to pass it with the approval of the Court.
Analysis of the states in terms of the figures given in Child Labor: Facts mm Fiuns,
CmanaEsq's Buiz-zu PuBmrcanox (1933) No. 197a 10 discredits the contention that it i3
fear of centralization, rather than a desire to undersell by means of lower labor standards,
that is the basic factor in delaying ratification. Of the ten states which have the fewert
children per thousand of population 14 to 15 years of age, inclusive, engaged in agricultural
and non-ag~ricultural occupations, nine have approved the amendment. Of the next 20
states, 13 have approved; of the remaining 18, only 2. Furthermore, over 75 per cent of
the employed children between 10 and 13 are found in the 9 worst states which have not
ratified. Id. at 4-6. The fate of the amendment, like the fate of state legislation, now
rests largely in the hands of its enemies.
32. 247 U. S. 251, 277 (1918).
33. Id. at 272. As in the case of Kidd v. Pear~son, 128 U. S. 1 (1888), it is again
dear that the Court lumped all forms of production, including the growing and harvesting
of raw materials, mining, and fabrication, in a single group, alike beyond the reach of
national power. It is in this general sense that the word "production" is used thoroughout
this article.
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terstate importance until it had at least exhausted the other powers84
expressly given to it by article I, section 8, the most promising of which
appeared to be those embraced in the very first clause:
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, im-
posts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense
and general welfare of the United States."
Although the clause is single, the power is dual: to tax, and to spend.
I
THE TAXING POWER
Non-revenue Motive. Even aside from the narrow construction of the
commerce clause, the use of the taxing power for other than revenue
purposes was a foregone conclusion. A tax measure is more liberally
construed than a criminal statute. The procedure for its enforcement
is simpler. Whereas one who is accused of crime may stand mute, the
citizen must disclose his liability to a tax.85 Hence it is not surprising
to find that when Congress undertook to put an end to the issuance of
paper currency by state banks it did so by means of a heavy tax, although
the Supreme Court held that it could legally accomplish the same result
by a prohibitive statute clearly labelled such."0 Of course, the use of pro-
34. The majority opinion in the Child Labor case, 247 U. S. 251 (1918), by a peculiar
twist of reasoning, seemed to intimate, to use a phrase of Professor Powell, that "the
Tenth Amendment contains a canon of interpretation as well as a caution against trespags,"
and that the national commercial power cannot include authority to regulate production,
because the Tenth Amendment reserves that power exclusively to the states. Although
Professor Corwin baptized this doctrine with a catchy name, "dual federalism," he likewise
so ably demonstrated the false logic upon which it was based that I had all but dismrised
it from my mind. For is it not obvious that the reserved powers of the states are by
definition merely those powers which have not been given to Congress, and that if Con-
gress is exercising a delegated power it cannot, by the very language of the amendment,
be exercising a reserved power? Corwin, Congress' Power to Prohibit Commerce (1933) 18
Coax. L. Q. 477; Powell, Commerce, Pensions, and Codes (1935) 49 HAv . Ray. 1, 8;
Cushman, supra note 1, at 781. But it is equally obvious that if the Court intended to
follow the "dual federalism" doctrine its child labor decision would be conclusive against
Congress, no matter what delegated power it purported to be exercising, whenever it should
undertake to regulate production. And it has chosen to follow it. See infra.
35. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259 (1927), holding that criminals must file in-
come tax Yeports disclosing the amount of their illegal gains.
Doubtless none of these 'rules apply when the alleged "tax" has no revenue motive but
is a penalty in disguise, but Congress may go far indeed before such a situation will be
held to exist. The question does not even seem to have been raised in connection with
either of the types of statutes mentioned later in this paragraph. But see Lipke v. Lederer,
259 U. S. 557 (1922); Regal Drug Co. v. Wardell, 260 U. S. 386 (1922); United States
v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U. S. 321 (1926). And see infra.
36. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869), sustaining 14 STAT. 146 (1866).
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hibitive tariffs as a substitute for an embargo is an accepted feature of
American life.3 7
There can be no doubt of the authority of Congress to use its taxing
power primarily, or even exclusively, for purposes other than the raising
of revenue when to do so will aid it in carrying out any of its delegated
powers, such as the regulation of commerce. But is the statute valid if
the non-revenue motive or effect concerns matters beyond Congress's
legislative powers? It was clear that this must be permitted at least up
to a certain point, since
"incidental regulation and control is inherent and inextricably bound up
with any exercise of the taxing power. It would be impossible for Con-
gress to levy a tax which did not have social and economic consequences
of a non-fiscal character. Taxation means burden; freedom from taxa-
tion means freedom from burden. The selection by Congress of the per-
sons and things and transactions which shall bear or escape that burden
necessitates the formulation of a regulatory policy affecting the social and
economic life of the nation. . . . In the levying of every tax Congress
must inevitably have a purpose other than the raising of revenue since it
cannot escape the responsibility of controlling in the national interest the
non-fiscal regulatory effects of its distribution of tax burdens. There can,
in short, be no such thing as taxation for revenue only."3s
That the Constitutional Fathers clearly realized this, and assumed that
Congress should and would consider such effects, is evident from Hamil-
ton's statement in number 12 of The Federalist?9 It was doubtless the
basis of the Supreme Court's statement,
"So long as the motive of Congress and the effect of its legislative action
are to secure revenue for the benefit of the general government, the exist-
ence of other motives in the selection of the subjects of taxes cannot
invalidate congressional action."'40
The opinion in the McCray case,41 although by a divided court, inti-
mated that, so long as Congress is careful not to disclose other than a
37. See University of Illinois v. United States, 2S9 U. S. 48 (1933), in which the basis of
decision is clearly broad enough to sustain such tariffs.
38. Cushman, supra note 1, at 764.
39. After pointing out that a national tax of one shilling per gallon on "ardent spirits"
would produce a handsome revenue, he added: "That article would wel1 bear this rate of
duty; and if it should tend to diminish the consumption of it, such an effect would be
equally favorable to the agriculture, to the economy, to the morals, and to the health of
sodety2'
40. Hampton v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 412 (1928). And see the similar state-
ment regarding state taxation in Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 47 (1934): "'rom
the beginning-of our government, the courts have sustained taxes although impoed with
the collateral intent of effecting ulterior ends which, considered apart, were beyond the
constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize by legislation directly addreszed to their
accomplishment 2'
41. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904); see Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8
Wall. 533 (U. S. 1866).
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revenue purpose on the face of a statute, such non-federal regulatory or
prohibitory purpose may be paramount, or even exclusive, and still the
statute will be beyond the reach of judicial review. Clearly Congress,
to prevent fraud occurring after the transportation ended, could have
forbidden the interstate carriage of butter substitutes artificially colored
to resemble butter. It chose, however, to place a prohibitive tax upon
the sale of such artificially colored substitutes, thus reaching intrastate
commerce as effectively as interstate. The majority held that "the mo-
tive or purpose of Congress in adopting the act in question may not be
inquired into" where there is no evidence of such motive in the act itself;
and that the mere size of the tax cannot be considered as evidence of
motive.
In United States v. Doremus42 it went even further, for here the
statute43 was largely a series of regulations obviously intended to bring
the sale of narcotics into the open and to forbid their sale for other than
what Congress considered to be legitimate purposes, thereby vesting
criminal jurisdiction in national hands to punish any anti-social sales.
Coupled, as they were, with license fees so low that they could not pos-
sibly pay the administrative expenses of enforcing these detailed regu-
lations, it is not too much to say that from a reading of the statute it-
self its purely regulatory purpose was evident. Yet the Supreme Court,
reversing a ruling of the trial judge,44 held that, although the regulations
might indicate that motives other than the raising of revenue had im-
pelled the exercise of the federal taxing power, the Court was not au-
thorized to inquire into such other motives as long as the regulations
enacted had some reasonable relation to the exercise of the taxing power
conferred by the Constitution. Here the regulations were sustainable
because "they tend to keep the traffic aboveboard and subject to inspec-
tion by those authorized to collect the revenue. 46
This made it appear that it would be necessary for Congress to declare,
rather than merely disclose, the essentially non-revenue purpose of a
law in order to cause the Court to abandon this rule of self-limitation.
And had it not been for the passage of the "Tax on Employment of Child
Labor" this condition might well have continued. But that statute was
42. 249 U. S. 86 (1919).
43. Harrison Narcotic Drug Act, 38 STAT. 785 (1914), 26 U. S. C. A. § 691 (1926).
44. United States v. Doremus, 246 Fed. 958 (NV. D. Tex. 1918).
45. 249 U. S. 86, 93 (1919).
46. Id. at 94. Four judges, including two who had concurred with the majority In
McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904), dissented. Possibly this shift is to be
accounted for on the facts of the cases, but no doubt the additional fact that the Child
Labor Tax Act, 40 STAT. 1138 (1919), was pending in Congress at the time the case was
argued and was signed by the President a week before it was decided, had an important
bearing.
47. But such decisions as Lipke v. Lederer and Regal Drug Co. v. Wardell, both supra
(Vol, 45
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a little too much, being a direct challenge to the Court's decision in
Hammer v. Dagenhart. As the majority pointed out,
"Grant the validity of this law, and all that Congress would need to
do, hereafter, in seeking to take over to its control any one of the great
number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of which the states
have never parted with, and which are reserved to them by the Tenth
Amendment, would be to enact a detailed measure of complete regula-
tion of the subject and enforce it by a so-called tax upon departures from
it. To give such magic to the word 'tax' would be to break down all
constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress and completely wipe
out the sovereignty of the states."48
Although this had been equally clear under the earlier cases, it had not
been so painfully evident, nor had Congress undertaken to use it as a
subterfuge to invade production, that sacred domain of the states.
The opinion of the Court would have been quite logical, had it not
been that it refused to concede that it was qualifying the old law. "Its
prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose," the Chief Justice wrote
in the course of his opinion, "are palpable. All others can see and
understand this. How can we properly shut our minds to it?" But was
not the efficiency of the "tax" involved in the McCray case inversely
proportional to the amount of money raised? Do we not commonly
refer to the statute involved in United States v. Doremus as the Harri-
son anti-Narcotic Act? But the Court found that the Child Labor tax
disclosed its regulatory purpose in the very nature of the regulations
determining liability to the tax: "The amount is not to be proportioned
in any degree to the extent or frequency of the departures, but is to be
paid by the employer in full whether he employs five hundred children
for a year, or employs only one for a day; "' the "tax" is not due unless
the employer "knowingly" violates these regulations; factories are to be
subject to inspection by agents of the Department of Labor, "whose
normal function is the advancement and protection of the welfare of the
workers." Passing the fact that the purpose of the Narcotic Act was
equally spread upon the face of the statute, it remains that the argu-
note 35, throw added light upon the ultimate inevitability of the Child Labor Tax Case rule.
Surely no Court could be expected to hold that a tax cannot be collected except through
the accepted processes of the criminal law because it is a penalty and not a tax, yet rule
that although invalid, if viewed as a penalty, because in e-xcezs of national power, it is
none the less enforceable because it is a tax. To tefuse to go behind the surface in the
former group of cases would enable the legislature, except where other than a pecuniary
penalty is desired, to evade all specific guarantees given to persons accused of crime. The
Court's embarrassment would be doubly increased if both issues were to be raised in a
single case, as they might well be.
48. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 38 (1922), construing 40 STAT. 1138
(1919).
49. Of course, privilege taxes often are set at a fixed sum regardless of the frequency
with which the privilege conferred is exercised.
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ment is only convincing if a reversal of the facts would have altered the
result. Suppose that Congress undertook to levy a prohibitory privilege
tax upon every employer of child labor, either at so much per factory or
so much per day per child, thus completely eliminating all exceptions.
Would this not be a still more serious interference with the "reserved
powers of the states" than the original act? Does anyone think that it
would be any less unconstitutional?
This point requires further consideration. Of course, a small tax of
this nature might be levied with an almost exclusively revenue motive
in view, and it is entirely probable that the Court would so hold. And it
is said to be axiomatic that "a tax, otherwise lawfully levied, does not
become unconstitutional merely because it is unduly burdensome." '
In the McCray case the Court refused to entertain any argument based
upon the premise that "the tax is too high"; and in Magnano v. Halnil-
ton5 it ruled that the doctrine of the Child Labor Tax Case had settled
that the fact "that a prohibition instead of a tax was intended might not
be inferred solely from its heavy burden." Yet in Hill v. Wallace,"
decided at the same time as the Child Labor Tax Case, the Court stated
that "the imposition of 20 cents a bushel on the various grains affected
by the tax is most burdensome,"0 3 and hence constituted valuable evi-
dence that "the manifest purpose of the tax is to compel boards of trade
to comply with regulations, many of which can have no relevancy to
the collection of the tax at all," and cannot be justified as embraced
within the power to regulate interstate commerce. Last December it
ruled,
"The exaction in question is highly exorbitant. This fact points in the
direction of a penalty rather than a tax. . . . The condition of the im-
position is the commission of a crime. This, together with the amount
of the tax, is again significant of penal and prohibitory intent rather than
the gathering of revenue. 01 4
In short, "a tax, otherwise lawfully levied, does not become unconstitu-
tional merely because it is unduly burdensome;" but the fact that it is
50. Cushman, supra note 1, at 763. For the most recent statement of this doctrine, see
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 56 Sup. Ct. 444, 447 (1936) ("If it were increased to a
high degree, as it could be if valid, it might well result in destroying both advertising
and circulation").
51. 292 U. S. 40, 47 (1934) (sustaining a state tax of 15 cents per pound on all butter
substitutes).
52. 259 U. S. 44, 66 (1922), holding the Future Trading Act, 42 STAT. 187 (1921), un-
constitutional.
53. In reaching this conclusion it examined the current market prices of the grains
affected by the "tax." Id. at 47, 66. Quaede, what conclusion would it have been forced
to reach, had it considered the current market prices of butter and butter substitutes in
the case cited in note 51, supra?
54. United States v. Constantine, 56 Sup. Ct. 223, 227 (1935).
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unduly burdensome may prove that it is not a tax, and hence that it is
not lawfidly levied.
Doubtless it is still true that motive may not be implied solely from
the rate of taxation. Mere logic requires such a conclusion, for figures
mean nothing of themselves. And the Magnano case," construing the
Child Labor Tax Case, insists that this further evidence must be derived
from a reading of the act itself. But must the Court, in construing the
statute, ignore outside evidence which throws further light upon the real
meaning and effect of these provisions? The opinions in the Child Labor
Tax Case and Hill v. Wallace"6 would not seem to intimate as much;
and certainly this was not done in the Hoosac Mills Case,6 7 where the
majority, to prove that the alleged "tax" wa- not a true tax, not only
resorted to other, although clearly supplementary, statutes but to state-
ments of the Department of Agriculture. Some may indulge a private
suspicion that they were aware of some of the statements of the President
himself, and that they did not try to forget them, even while weighing
their decision.
The recent decision in Grosjean v. American Press Co."5 further sub-
stantiates this conclusion. Explaining why the Louisiana tax on peri-
odicals of large circulation violates the "due process" guarantee of free-
dom of the press, Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote:
"It is bad because, in the light of its history and of its present setting,
it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to
limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled."
Obviously neither this "history" nor "present setting" are intrinsic to
the statute.
Even Nigro v. United States,"e although substantially an affirmance
of the Doremus decision, ° expanded the bases of judicial review. The
opinion in Hampton & Co. v. United States,61 decided in the same year,
intimated that both the motive and the effect of a tax, to be sustained
as such, must be the raising of revenue; and Grosjean v. American Press
Co. 2 clearly has raised this dictum to a rule of law. The Nigro case
55. 292 U. S. 40, 47 (1934). 56. See note 53, supra.
57. United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 322 (1936). Apparently what is evidence
of motive in spending is also evidence of motive in imposing a regulatory or prohibitory
"tax:' In any case, the future bearing of the majority's conclusions is evident, as it ignored
this distinction in insisting that it was discussing an identical situation with that of the
Child Labor Tax Case. And see the discusion of the Bankhead Cotton Control Act in the
Bvtler case, discussed infra.
58. 56 Sup. Ct. 444, 449 (1936). 59. 276 U. S. 332 (1928).
60. 249 U. S. 86 (1919). 61. 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
62. 56 Sup. Ct. 459 (1936). Its ruling cannot possibly be reconciled with an assumption
that the actual raising of even a large sum of money can cure the defect of non-revenue
motive. If this is true of a state statute, is it not equally true of a federal one?
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held that the fact that the amended narcotic act actually yielded an
income of a million dollars a year settled the second, while it apparently
felt that the first was foreclosed by the earlier ruling. But if the ac-
count books can be resorted to to prove a profit, are they not equally
available to prove a lack of the same? Indeed, the judges may even in
time set up their own criteria of cost accounting, for the net revenue
is obviously the gross income less the expense of collection, including
in the latter item the enforcing of all regulations intended to "keep the
traffic aboveboard and subject to inspection by those authorized to col-
lect the revenue." The fact that it has never yet undertaken to do so
is not significant.63 After all, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. itself is less
than 14 years old, and we have come far in that time.
A pending problem or the most recent ruling, contingent upon one's
views concerning stare decisis and the ratio decidendi of a case, concerns
the claims to recovery of taxes paid under the Bankhead Cotton Control
Act of 1934,4 later copied in the Tobacco" and Potato0 acts, all of
which have recently been repealed. 7 These statutes provided for the
determination of the total probable requirements of the market and the
allotment to each farmer of .his share of this total. The sale of any
products produced in excess of this allotment was subject to a tax which
was clearly intended to be prohibitory, the rate in the case of cotton
being 50 per cent of the average central market price, of tobacco 33 1/3
per cent of the actual price for* which it is sold, and of potatoes 3/4
of one cent per pound. The cotton tax was levied upon the ginner, but
the tobacco and potato taxes were paid by the producer.08 The issuance
of tax exemption stamps to each producer in the full sum of his allot-
ment aided in the administration of the law, since all products were
thus required to bear stamps, either "tax paid" or "tax exempt," and
also enabled the farmer suffering from a crop failure to realize an income
from the sale of his stamps to some other farmer who had had such a
63. Many of the most remarkable expansions of judicial review have occurred through
rulings that seemed at the time to be very narrow, indeed. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386
(U. S. 1798), restricted the ex post fato clause to the field of crimes, yet it helped to
prepare the way for later cases, whereby the Court's view of the "reasonablenem" of civil
statutes has become the test of their validity. C. B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226
(1897), Teversing the ruling in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 (1878), held
that "due process" guarantees just compensation in eminent domain cases, although it
sustained an award that seemed pitifully small. In the long run it has been the general
doctrine, rather than this specific application of it, that has assumed significance.
64. 48 STAT. 598, 7 U. S. C. A. § 701 et seq. (1934).
65. 48 STAT. 1275, 7 U. S. C. A. § 751 et seq. (1934).
66. 49 STAT. 782, 7 U. S. C. A. § 801 et seq. (1935).
67. P. L. No. 433, 74th Cong. (1936).
68. This distinction, even if it were not clearly superficial, is of no importance. Gin.
ning, like growing, is a phase of "p~oduction," and occurs "before transportation begings.
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good crop as to exceed his quota. Those who declined to cooperate with
the entire crop reduction program of the AAA received neither allot-
ment nor tax exemption certificates, and consequently were taxed upon
their entire production to the extent that it was marketed.
Apparently these statutes were drafted under the impression that the
Court would sustain national regulation of production of crops the larger
portion of which is ultimately destined for use in interstate or foreign
commerce, since they clearly revealed their motive to be to restrict "the
ginning of cotton in excess of . . . probable market requirements,""9
"to more effectively balance production and consumption of tobacco,""0
and "to establish and maintain such balance between the production,
sale, and consumption of potatoes' 71 as would restore the farmer's in-
come to its pre-depression purchasing power. But whatever hopes may
have existed on that score were effectively dissipated by the fate of the
processing taxes under the original AAA act. Will the Court, notwith-
standing, refuse to examine the evidence of motive and sustain these
statutes as taxing measures? Dismissal of Moor v. Texas and N. 0.
Ry. Co.7" and the anticipated dismissal of Georgia v. Morgenthali'3 is
thought by some to hold the question open until it can reach the Court
in a suit to recover taxes paid under protest. The author's own view
is that the majority definitely ruled upon these taxes in the Hoosac Mills
Case"' and held them invalid. The trial is over; only the official funeral
remains.
In belaboring the point that the original AAA act was intended to
regulate the production of basic agricultural products-a point which I
believe all will concede, including those who feel that the case was im-
properly decided-Mr. Justice Roberts wrote:
69. 4S STAT. 599, § 3, 7 U. S. C. A. § 703 (a) (1934).
70. 48 STAT. 1276, § 2, 7 U. S. C. A. § 752 (1934). The 1935 amendments, 49 STnr. 778,
added the phrase "to raise revenue." One can almost hear the Court thunder, "That
proves that it was an afterthought !"
71. 49 STAT. 784, 7 U. S. C. A. § 803 (1935). The refusal of the government in the
Hoosac Mills case to defend the original A. A. A. act as a valid execise of the commerce
power thus virtually amounted to throwing the cotton, tobacco, and potato acts to the
wolves. Doubtless, this tactic was based upon a fear, by no means groundless, that such
an argument would only antagonize certain members of the Court and hence imperil the
chances for victory under the spending power. The present majority does not wich to
have the correctness of Hammer v. Dagenhart questioned.
72. 56 Sup. Ct. 372 (1936), the Court stating that the granting or refusal of the par-
ticular remedy sought was discretionary with the trial judge.
73. As the state grows cotton on its prison farms, it was permitted to le an original
petition in the Supreme Court to enjoin the collection of the tax, 56 Sup. Ct. 176 (1935).
With the repeal of the tax, it would seem that the case no longer involves 2, living con-
troversy.
74. United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).
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"It is pointed out that, because there still remained a minority whom
the rental and benefit payments were insufficient to induce to surrender
their independence of action, the Congress has gone further and, in the
Bankhead Cotton Act, used the taxing power in a more directly minatory
fashion to compel submission.' This progression only serves more fully
to expose the coercive purpose of the so-called tax imposed by the present
act. It is clear that the Department of Agriculture has properly described
the plan as one to keep a non-cooperating minority in line. This is coercion
by economic pressure. The asserted power of choice is illusory." 76
Funk and Wagnalls define "minatory" as "threatening, as with des-
truction or punishment." If the majority had any intention of consid-
ering the matter further they would have chosen a less expressive word;
and certainly they would not have stated that "Congress has gone fur-
ther" in the Bankhead act than it had gone in the original act, which one
gathers from the opinion was in itself much too far. And it is not ex-
pecting a little too much even to hope that a Court which will turn a
double back somersault in its logic in order to invalidate a regulatory
measure based upon the spending power will be open to a suggestion
that it permit the same result under the taxing power? 70 Apparently
the Administration was of such opinion, for the new farm relief meas-
ure77 makes no use of such "taxes."
The 1935 session of Congress also gave us two other "tax" provisions
which must ultimately face this test of validity of motive. The Bitumi-
nous Coal Stabilization Act78 levies an excise of 15 per cent of the selling
price of such coal at the mines, those who accept the regulatory provis-
ions of the act receiving a rebate of 90 per cent of their tax. Obviously
this is merely another way of saying that those who refuse to come
under the Code shall pay ten times the tax paid by their competitors
who do so, the difference as clearly being a penalty as any ever adopted
by Congress. Unless the law is to become a shambles, such a levy can
only be sustained on the ground that Congress has authority under the
commerce power to impose these regulations upon this industry.
More is to be said for the "tax on employers of eight or more" levied
by the Social Security Act,7 which permits credits up to 90 per cent of
the federal tax to employers contributing to a state unemployment in-
surance fund. As the credits may actually exceed the payments made
75. Id. at 321.
76. There is the added difficulty that the proceeds of these taxes, like the processing
taxes themselves, were earmarked for use in carrying on the illegal activities of the A. A. A.
Hence they are clearly within the rule of the Hoosac Mills case. But that is another story,
which is discussed in the following section.
77. P. L. No. 461, 774th Cong. (1936).
78. 49 STAT. 991, § 3, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 801, 804 (1935); for a comprehensive survey of
the constitutional law problems raised by the act, see Comment (1935) 45 YALF, L. 3. 293,
79. 49 STAT. 639, §§ 901-910, 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 1101-1110 (1935).
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to the state under an approved law, whereas no credits are allowed on
account of payments under a state law which has not been approved by
the Social Security Board, they cannot be defended solely as efforts to
lessen the hardships of double taxation, as in the case of inheritance
taxes.80 Nor can the tax, as qualified by this credit system, be defended
solely as a means of protecting firms in a state which adopts an un-
employment insurance act from the advantages that might otherwise ac-
crue to their competitors in states without such laws, as its effect is by
no means restricted to interstate commerce. It is clearly intended to
force a state to adopt this form of social insurance or see the money
which it could otherwise use for this purpose disappear into the coffers
of the nation, to be used, of course, in large part, to support federal
activities in other states.
This is the very antithesis of revenue motive. As in the case of the
oleomargarine tax sustained in McCray v. United States,8' the success
of the act is to be measured by its failure to raise a substantial sum. Yet
the normal line of reasoning is not available to attack it. The child
labor "tax" was a penalty imposed upon those who employed children.
In the Constantine case, 12 the levy was a penalty for violating state or
local laws. But here the taxpayer can do nothing personally to comply
with the credit clauses of the act. He is not penalized for persisting in
a given line of conduct, but for living in a particular state. Unless a
state is a proper party to protest against this effort to force its handP3
or unless a private citizen can protest against this effort to force the
hand of his state government,' the taxpayer will do better to attack
it as a tax which is invalid because it violates the rule of uniformity.'5
When all is said and done, the ultimate decision will probably hinge
upon the majority's attitude toward federal compulsion to speed up the
adoption of state systems of social insurance.
So. The Federal Estate Tax allows a credit up to 80 pet cent becauze of death duties
paid to a state. 44 STAT. 70, § 301 (b) (1926), as amended, 47 SrT. 278, 26 U. S. C. A. §
413 (b) (1934). See Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12 (1927).
81. 195 U. S. 27 (1904).
82. 56 Sup. Ct. 223 (1935).
83. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923), would seem to indicate that it is
not. See the discussion of this case infra.
84. Likewise Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923), is not to be taken as pre-
cluding such a possibility. There the taxpayer was not a proper party because he had no
direct interest at stake, the money being taken from the general fund. Here he is reatting
a tax as a link in an illegal chain, and as the tax is to be paid by him he has a direct
pecuniary interest. Compare United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 315-317 (1936). Both
cases are discussed infra.
85. "All duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United Statir."
U. S. Coxsr. Art I, § 8, c. 1. And see Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932), which
would seem to hold that the Fifth Amendment fobids arbitrary clas-ifications in violation
of "equal protection of the laws."
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Summary. The present status of the law in this field is best sum-
marized by Professor Cushman. The more recent cases have only served
to illustrate the prophetic vision of his statement.
"The Magnano case, which relies upon and thus reaffirms and re-
establishes the McCray case of 1904, shows that the Court desires to eat
its cake and keep it too in the matter of the validity of destructive taxa-
tion. No amount of logical analysis will disclose any inherent differences
in kind between the child labor tax and the oleomargarine taxes upheld
in the McCray case and now in the Magnano case. In both cases the
legislative intention was regulation and destruction per se, and all intelli-
gent people, including the Court, were well aware of that fact. But the
Court preserves two different techniques for dealing with such statutes.
When it wishes to uphold the statute, it utilizes the doctrine of the McCray
and Magnano cases, which may be called the doctrine of judicial obtuseness,
and refuses to see or know anything about the tax which does not appear
in the language of the act. If, however, the act pushes too far and im-
pinges upon interests which the Court feels are entitled to protection, it
falls back upon the doctrine of the child labor tax case, takes judicial
notice of the palpable legislative intention to destroy rather than to raise
money, and declares the act void on the ground that it is not a tax at all
but a regulation."861
How lenient the Court intends to be in exercising this new power
only time will tell. But one thing should be evident from the Child
Labor and Koosac Mills cases. It has no intention to permit Congress
to regulate production.
Illegal Purpose. In the cases which we have just considered the taxes
were not held void because the motive was to raise money to be spent
for an illegal purpose, but because the motive was not to raise money.
They were not taxes for illegal purposes; they simply were not taxes.
If the proceeds, assuming that there are to be any, are to be paid into
the general fund, there to be mixed with other revenues and used for any
purpose for which money may lawfully be withdrawn from that fund,
the argument that it is not really a tax is the only one available aside
from the normal ones of jurisdiction, equality of treatment, and the like.
But it is an axiom of American constitutional law that taxes may only
be levied for a public purpose,87 a "Requirement (which) has regard
to the use which is to be made of the revenue derived from the tax." s8
Hence if the proceeds are earmarked for a certain purpose, which the
Court finds to be other than a public one, the invalidity of the appro-
priation may taint the entire transaction and invalidate the tax. In
86. Cushman, Constitutional Law in 1933-34 (1935) 29 Am. PoL. Scl. Rav. 36, 51.
87. This is now a requirement of "due process of law," although it was originally ap-
plied as a principle of natural justice. See Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall, 655
(1874); Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1 (1885); Grant, The Natural Law Background of
Due Process (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 56, 64.
88. Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 43 (1934).
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the case of the national government there is the additional requirement
that the appropriation must be for a purpose for which Congress, under
its delegated powers, may validly spend money; for as Chief Justice
Marshall once said, "The Congress is not empowered to tax for those
purposes which are within the exclusive province of the states." 89  Or
as the Court has more recently phrased it in the Hoosac Mills Case,
"The power to appropriate is as broad as the power to tax;"290 and con-
versely, the power to tax is as narrow as the power to spend.'
It was the latter set of facts which faced the Court in the Hoosac
Mills Case. The processing taxes were passed with as exclusively rev-
enue motives in view as it is possible to entertain, and their efficiency
in accomplishing this purpose is confirmed by the fact that up to last
October, when a flood of petitions for injunctions against their collection
impounded some $200,000,000 in federal courts, they had yielded just
a few millions shy of a billion dollars. 2  Unlike the taxes of the Bank-
head act,3 they were not "themselves the instruments of regulation."
If they suffered from any congenital constitutional infirmity, it was
solely due to the purpose for which the money was to be spent.
The minority concluded that these facts establish that the processing
taxes are true taxes,90 although they conceded that this still left open
the question of their validity. But the majority insisted:
"The whole revenue from the levy is appropriated in aid of crop control;
none of it is made available for governmental use .... The statute not
only avows an aim foreign to the procurement of revenues for the sup-
port of Government, but by its operation shows the exaction laid upon
processors to be the necessary means for the intended control of agri-
cultural production. . . . It is inaccurate and misleading to speak of the
exaction . . .as a tax, or to say that as a tax it is subject to no infirmity.
A tax, in the general understanding of the term, and as used in the Con-
stitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the Government. The
word has never been thought to connote the expropriation of money from
one group for the benefit of another. We may concede that the latter
sort of imposition is constitutional when imposed to effectuate regulation
89. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199 (1824). This is not, as so many seem to have
assumed, a statement of the limits of the spending power. See infra.
90. United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 319 (1936).
91. Although this second phrase does not occur in the opinion it is implicit in the rea-
soning of majority and minority alike.
92. N. Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1936, at 1, col. 4.
93. 48 STAT. 598, 7 U. S. C. A. § 701 et seq. (1934).
94. "The levy is not any the less an exercise of -the taxing power, because it is intended
to defray an expenditure for the general welfare rather than for some other support of
government. Nor is the levy and collection of the tax pointed to as effecting the
regulation .... Here regulation, if any there be, is accomplished not by the tax but by
the method by which its proceeds are expended, and would equally be accomplished by
any like use of public funds, regardless of their source." Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo,
J. J., dissenting, United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 325 (1936).
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of a matter in which both groups are interested and in respect of which
there is a power of legislative regulation. But, manifestly, no justification
for it can be found unless as an integral part of such regulation. The
exaction cannot be wrested out of its setting, denominated an excise for
raising revenue and legalized by ignoring its purpose. . . . To do this
would be to shut our eyes to what all others can see and understand ...
The exaction (is) not a true tax." 95
This line of reasoning presents several problems, and not a few diffi-
culties, of a logical nature. Does the majority mean to imply that a
tax is not a tax unless its proceeds are paid into the general fund for
undesignated purposes? Would a surtax upon the incomes of those
in the higher brackets cease to be a tax because it was earmarked for
use in paying a soldiers' bonus or constructing a battleship, a gasoline
tax because it was earmarked for use in constructing and repairing high-
ways, or a liquor sales tax because it was appropriated in advance to a
campaign for temperance? Even conceding the power of whichever
government might be concerned to pay a soldiers' bonus, construct a
battleship, or carry on temperance propaganda, would it be necessary
to prove that millionaires "are interested" in the payment of a soldiers'
bonus and the construction of a larger navy, and saloon keepers and
night club operators in the theory and practice of temperance, in order
to sustain such taxes? Is this not to convert all earmarked taxes from
such into "special assessments," and hence measurable only on the
basis of benefit and not on that of ability to pay or some other accept-
able criterion of taxation? But the fact which is most to be deplored
is that the reasoning, in the course of its argument, switches subjects,
only to return to its starting point when it desires to draw as a conclu-
sion the same statement with which it opened as a major promise. "It
is inaccurate and misleading to speak of the exaction . . . as a tax, or
to say that as a tax it is subject to no infirmity." This is a dual state-
ment, and the two parts have no necessary connection. One may con-
cede that it is subject to a fatal infirmity-being levied, as the majority
holds, for an illegal purpose-without this concession having the slightest
bearing upon the first statement. Apparently what the majority meant
-but one hesitates to even venture an opinion as to what they meant,
except that they proposed to put an end to the AAA, at least in its
present form-is that there can be no such thing as an unconstitutional
tax, for the very fact that it is unconstitutional proves, not that it is
an invalid tax, but that it is not a tax."; Thus the law is at least made
simple, and the great mass of erudition on the subject of "the recovery
of unconstitutional taxes'0 7 is relegated to limbo.
Whatever else may be said of this reasoning, it had the advantage
95. Id. at 317. 96. But see note 111, infra.
97. See FiELD, THE ErrEcT oF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STAaUT (1935) c. X.
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of making the Child Labor Tax Case appear in point, and thus furnished
a semblance of precedent for the Court's ruling. It also furnished a basis
for deciding the Rice Millers' CasesP8 in favor of the petitioners, which
might otherwise have proved a very difficult task. The 1935 amend-
ments to the AAA act had specifically declared that neither injunctive
proceedings nor an action to secure a declaratory judgment should lie
against such taxes, 9 yet at the same time undertook to force the pro-
cessor to absorb the tax as a condition precedent to bringing an action
to recover them when paid under protest, the burden being placed upon
him to prove that they had not been passed back to the farmer or on
to the consumer.100 Had the Court denied the injunction on the basis
of the 1935 amendment, all processors whose taxes had been held up
pending the decision of this test case would have been forced to pay and
then sue to recover. This would have had the advantage of treating all
processors alike, but it would have given the Court but two alternatives:
to sustain the statute limiting the right to recover, thus in effect validat-
ing the collection and retention of taxes even after they had been held
unconstitutional, or to hold this provision invalid, thus opening the door
to a still more serious drain on the national treasury. Either would have
caused an appreciable period of uncertainty and a flood of litigation,
which might have reacted unfavorably against the courts, and would
have sacrificed the opportunity for a spectacular coup that might well
serve as a telling blow against the "New Deal""" by hitting the Ad-
ministration in its pocketbook. 02 But the second alternative, as a sup-
98. Rickert Rice AMlls v. Fontenot, 56 Sup. Ct. 374 (1936).
99. 49 STAT. 770, § 30 (a), 7 U. S. C. A. § 623 (a) (1935).
100. 49 STAT. 770, § 30 (d), 7 U. S. C. A. § 623 (d) (1935).
101. The majority has been extremely careful to avoid any intimation that it i3 the
philosophy of those now in high places which it finds distasteful. It has not ahays been
so. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 15S U. S. 601, 627 (1895), in which the
majority, reversing Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586 (180), and holding a national
income tax unconstitutional, referred to "the speculative views of political economists
or revenue reformers." Counsel, however, do not seem to have been impreed by this
linguistic quiescence. See Mir. Beck's argument in the T. 11. A. case as reported in a United
Press dispatch for December 20, 1935; or Mr. Pepper's closing phrase in the Hoosrac f mls
case: "I pray Almighty God that not in my time will the land of the regimented be substi-
tuted for the land of the free." N. Y. Times, December 11, 1935, at 8, col. 4.
102. The public, however, which in reality paid the AAA processing taxes in the form
of higher prices, pyramided through the various stages of the commercial process, will
continue to pay them in new taxes, for the farmer must still receive his bonus although
the taxes originally levied to pay it cannot be collected because it was not legal to pay
them in the first place. That such is the present law is beyond dispute. See United States
v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 247 (1896), which is discussed infra. And this is one rule of
constitutional law which the laws of polities decree cannot be changed, at least for the
present.
Such situations as that in which we now find ourselves reveal the essential .eakness, not
to mention inaccuracy, of the classic statement that "an unconstitutional statute is not a
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plement to the injunction in cases where the processor has already paid
the tax, is still a possibility, the Court having refrained from express-
ing any opinion as to its validity. However, as there is authority for the
rule that a court, at common law, should deny recovery where the tax-
payer has passed on the tax and has manifested no intention of reim-
bursing the ultimate sufferers or is not in a position to do so, 10 3 it would
be strange indeed to hold that Congress cannot give statutory status to
such a rule. As a question of abstract justice, as well as of practical ad-
ministration, it has much to commend it.
Of course, the processor, in suing to recover these payments, may
stress the ruling that they "are not taxes." It is unfortunate that the
majority did not go a step further and tell us what, then, they are. True,
in stating the form of the injunction it did refer to them as "exactions."
But that is an innocuous word which the dictionary defines as including
taxes. In such cases as Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.1°4 the answer is
simple--they are penalties. The same is true of cases falling in the
category with Regal Drug Co. v. Wardell.1°5 But it is equally clear that
the processing taxes are not penalties. They are not intended to force
the processor to do or not to do anything whatever except to pay the
tax. We may safely venture the prediction that so far as recovery suits
are concerned the Court will apply the law of taxation for the very
simple reason that there is no other law to apply.
When one seeks to find the legal basis for the granting of these in-
junctions in the Rice Millers' Cases, he finds that the opinion is far from
clear. In Lipke v. Lederer106 a statute of general application providing
that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection
of any tax shall be maintained in any court,"'0 7 was held not to apply
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 442 (18856). After all, a court can annul a
marriage, but it cannot annul the child. Perhaps there is more merit than most Americans
have been willing to concede in the Austrian plan whereby a statute is considered as
valid until it is held unconstitutional by the Supreme Constitutional Court, the decision
having prospective force only, the court even having an option to permit the act to
continue in force for a limited period while it is being replaced by a constitutional
one. See ADAmOViCn, DiE PR1 FUNG DER GESETZE UND VERORDNUNGEN DURCIS DEN 5sTER-
RCMCS. MN VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSHOr (1927); EIsENMANN, LA JUSTICE CoNSTITUTIONNELr1
r LA HAUTE COUR CONSmrUTIoNAL D'Avuic (1928); Grant, Judicial Review of
Legislation Uider the Auistrian Constitution of 1920 (1934) 28 Aia. PoL. Sc. Ray. 670;
Kelsen, La Garantie Juridictionnelle de la Constitution (1929) ANNUAIR DE V'bSTITUT
INTERNATIONAL DE DRorr PUB=Ic 52; 1-5 KEmsEN, KoimENTAR ZUR BURDESVERFASSUNG
(1919-22); AUsTRAAN CONST. OF 1934, Art. 163.
103. See FiELD, op. cit. supra note 97, at 254-5.
104. 259 U. S. 20 (1922). 105. 260 U. S. 386 (1922).
106. 259 U. S. 557 (1922).
107. 14 STAT. 475 (1867), 26 U. S. C. A. § 154 (1926).
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to taxes in form but penalties in fact. In Miller v. Standard NuAt Mar-
garine Co305 "special and extraordinary" circumstances were held, as a
matter of statutory interpretation, to remove a case from the application
of this provision. But such decisions are scarcely in point where, as here,
the statute referred specifically and solely to processing taxes, and was
obviously passed with the "special and extraordinary" circumstances sur-
rounding the collection of those taxes in mind. Under such conditions
changing the name of the tax to a penalty is of no avail. Yet the opinion
simply stated:
"The exaction still lacks the quality of a true tax. It remains a means
for effectuating the regulation of agricultural production. . . . As yet
the petitioner has not paid the taxes to the respondent, and, in view of
the decision in the Butler case, hereafter can not be required so to do.
If the respondent should now attempt to collect the tax by distraint he
would be a trespasser, . . . decree enjoining collection. . . .,,10
As this could not have been statutory interpretation, it follows that the
Court has held the provision forbidding injunctions unconstitutional as
applied to an invalid tax, at least where the tax has been held uncon-
stitutional in a prior decision, and the Court concludes that because of
this unconstitutionality it is not a true tax. Yet it did so in the absence
of proof of even the normal requirements of equity jurisdiction, since it
stated that "We have no occasion to discuss or decide whether section
21 (d) affords an adequate remedy at law."'"0 This is truly a remark-
able ruling.'
Hence we may conclude that if the proceeds of a tax are earmarked for
use for an illegal purpose, the person subject to the tax may plead this
illegal use and thus avoid payment. In the AAA cases the Supreme
Court based this conclusion upon the rule that such an exaction is not
a true tax, although obviously it is not a penalty either. This par-
ticular line of reasoning is less important than the fact that the tax-
payer can assert a claim based upon the use to be made of the funds.
It would have been easier, perhaps, and certainly no less logical, to have
103. 284 U. S. 498 (1932). And see Note (1935) 49 H.,v. L. Ri,. 109.
109. Rickert Mills Co. v. Fontenot, 56 Sup. Ct. 374, 375 (1936).
11o. Ibid.
111. Cf. State Railway Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1875), holding that the general act
validly forbade enjoining taxes which, for purposes of the decis on, were conzidered
to be unconstitutional. The only distinction would seem to be that in that case no
prior ruling on the question of constitutionality had been rendered. Of courze, there 13
also the possibility that the Court in the instant case is applying a new variation of "dual
federalism," and that somehow the fact that the proceeds of the proces-ing taxes are to be
used in order to control production places them in a distinct category from other taxes
levied for an illegal purpose, depriving them of their character as taxes and rendering
them more subject to control by equity processes. Certainly the opinion in the Hoosac
Mills case, in deciding the principal issue, applied the "dual federalism" doctrine in a thor-
ough-going fashion. See infra.
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placed it upon the standard doctrine that a taxpayer has a special in-
terest in the use to be made of the funds exacted from him.13i" When
we come to the second side of the story-when is this earmarked use
illegal-we face the issue which was the real bone of contention in the
Hoosac Mills Case: What is the scope of the national spending power?
II
THE SPENDING POWER
When the Constitution declares that Congress may appropriate money
"to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general wel-
fare of the United States," what does it mean? Is this clause merely
ancillary to the other delegated powers, intended solely to enable the
national government to raise and spend money to carry on its normal
functions without the necessity of resorting, as under the Articles of
Confederation, to the state legislatures for the raising of the desired
funds? Or is it an independent grant of power, enabling Congress to
spend money for the accomplishment of purposes over and above its
other delegated powers? If so, how much broader is its power to spend
than its power to govern? To what extent can it use this spending power
as a basis of governing?
The Decisions Prior To 1936
Although these questions have been subject to constant discussion
from the time of The Federalist Papers to the present day, the Court
until this year was a non-participant in the controversy. Despite the
fact that the issue had been raised on numerous occasions, the judges
had never found it either necessary or expedient to pass upon it. Mar-
shall, to be sure, did state that "Congress is not empowered to tax for
those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the states,")=
from which it follows, of course, that it is not empowered to spend the
tax moneys for those purposes. But that statement throws no light upon
the real issue: What purposes, so far as spending is concerned, are within
the exclusive province of the states?
In Field v. Clark"4 the Court's attention was directed to the sugar
bounty clauses of the Tariff Act of 1890,". the validity of which was
conceded to rest upon a broad construction of the spending power. Al-
112. This doctrine can be more conveniently considered in connection with the question,
who can contest the validity of an appropriation from the general fund? See inira.
113. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199 (1824).
114. 143 U. S. 649, 695 (1892).
115. 26 STAT. 567, 583 (1890). Those desiring to participate in these bounties were re-




though somewhat similar to the rental and benefit payments under the
AAA they were intended to stimulate, rather than reduce, production,
and had been placed in the act as compensation for the abandonment of
tariff protection. An importer, resisting the collection of duties on
other articles, contended that the bounties were unconstitutional and that
their invalidity voided the entire tariff schedule. The Court, however,
stating, "It would be difficult to suggest a question of larger importance,
or one the decision of which would be more far-reaching," concluded
that it need not pass upon it, since "even if the position of the appellants
with respect to these bounties were sustained, it is clear that the parts
of the act in which they are interested . . . would remain in force."
The 1894 act," 6 which restored the tariff on sugar, repealed these
bounty provisions, but not until many producers had already signed
license agreements and entered upon the production of their 1894-95
crops. When the administration construed this repealer to forbid pay-
ments under such existing licenses its interpretation was challenged by
producers, who sought to force payment through mandamus proceed-
ings. Counsel for the government then raised the additional contention
that the original bonus act had been unconstitutional. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held" 7 for the government on both grounds,
although it is not clear if its ruling on the constitutional issue was based
in part on a narrow construction of the spending power or solely on the
conclusion that these particular bounties, not being made for a public
purpose, violated the Fifth Amendment.
Before the question could reach the Supreme Court, Congress had
provided 8 that all bounties due under existing licenses should be paid.
But the Comptroller of the Treasury, of opinion that both the original
bounty act and this act were unconstitutional, refused to honor any
warrants to pay such claims."19 In this modified form the question was
carried to the Supreme Court,'z  which again refused to pass upon the
validity of the original act.
"The question (of the scope of the national spending power) is one of
the very gravest importance," it stated, and "should not be decided with-
out very mature investigation and deliberation, and only when absolutely
necessary .. . In the view we take . . . the rights of the parties may
be passed upon . . . without our entering upon a discussion as to the
validity of the bounty."
It then held that producers who had governed their actions in accord-
116. 28 STAT. 509, 521 (1894).
117. iles Planting Co. v. Carlisle, 5 App. D. C. 138 (1894).
118. 28 STAT. 910, 933 (1895).
119. In re Sugar Bounty, 2 Dec. Comp. Treas. 98 (1895).




ance with the terms of their licenses under the act of 1890, even if that
act was unconstitutional, "acquired claims upon the government of an
equitable, moral or honorable nature," and that "The power of Con-
gress extends at least as far as the . . . payment of claims . . . which
are thus founded."
In rendering this decision it ventured the opinion that the validity
of such an appropriation "can rarely, if ever, be the subject of review
by the judicial branch of the government." Apparently it meant by this
that the validity of a moral claim is a political question, to be decided
by Congress. Certainly it could not have meant that the question could
not be raised in court for lack of a proper party plaintiff, since the case
then before it demonstrated one way in which a living controversy be-
tween parties in interest might easily arise. Indeed, the whole tenor
of this opinion, as well as of that in Field v. Clark, was one of willing-
ness to pass upon the scope of the "general welfare" clause whenever
that question should be determinative of the rights of the parties before
it. But before many years had passed other decisions had rendered it
exceptionally difficult to find a proper party to raise such an issue in
court unless, as in United States v. Realty Co., the administration itself
forced the issue by refusing to obey the statute.
It is idle to expect those who profit from the government's largess to
refuse to accept its bounties even though they doubt both their consti-
tutionality and their economic wisdom; for as others have remarked it
is hard to object to Santa Claus. Even if some were to do so this would
not give us a test case, since the government would scarcely undertake
judicial proceedings, even if it were possible to do so, to force them to
accept either gift or loan. Consequently some remedy must be avail-
able to those who are injured if there is to be any judicial check upon the
spending propensities of our legislatures. In normal cases the only
parties injured are those who pay but do not receive, or at least pay
more than they receive, and so the all but unanimous rule has recognized
the right of any taxpayer, on his own behalf or that of taxpayers in
general, to enjoin the spending of money pursuant to an unconstitutional
appropriation.' Of course, where his contributions are definitely des-
121. See, among many, Burke v. Snively, 208 Ill. 328, 70 N. E. 327 (1904); Rlppo v.
Becker, 56 Minn. 100, 57 N. W. 331 (1894); Fischer v. Marsh, 113 Neb. 153, 202 N, W.
422 (1925) ; White Eagle Oil Co. v. Gunderson, 48 S. D. 608, 205 N. W. 614 (1925) ; Iloleges
v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456, 135 N. W. 164 (1912). Occasionally, as in Jones v. Reed, 3 Wash,
57, 27 Pac. 1067 (1891), proof of special injury to the complainant is required. Consult
Horack, Federal-State Co-operation Jor Social Security (1935) 30 IrL. L. Rav. 292, 309.
Cases involving spending by local governments are legion, and almost never require pyoof of
special injury.
It is quite common to grant an injunction even where the money is to be used for a
self-liquidating project and there is no evidence of probable loss and hence no proof of any
danger of increased taxation. See Fischer v. Marsh and White Eagle Oil Co. v. Gunderson,
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tined for this illegal use his injury is direct and its extent is evident;
but even where the money is to be taken from the general fund his
interest is no less real, since every illegal expenditure from this fund
leaves a correspondingly smaller amount for the payment of legitimate
expenses and must necessarily result in increased taxation. Hence the
justice of the rule requiring neither special interest nor special injury.
Not only has the Supreme Court accepted this standard rule in the
case of municipal corporations,12 - but it has applied it as recently as
1920 to state appropriations as well. In Hawk v. Sinith' 23 there was
no mention of special injury, and as only a small sum was at stake-the
cost of printing and distributing ballots for a referendum on the legis.
lature's ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment-there could have
been but little financial injury at best. Yet the Supreme Court, revers-
ing the state tribunal, granted the injunction. In Green v. Frazier'-
the appropriations were sustained, but no question was made of the
standing of the petitioning taxpayers to raise the issue of their validity.
One would normally think that the same rule should apply to the nation.
Yet as early as 189 9 11 the Court questioned the availability of this
remedy in the case of federal expenditures; in 19072 it intimated that
the petitioner must at least "disclose the amount of his interest"; and
finally, in 1923127 it clearly established the doctrine that a taxpayer,
even though a millionaire, does not have a sufficient interest at stake to
enjoin the spending of a few millions of dollars, taken from the general
fund, for a purpose allegedly beyond the constitutional powers of Con-
gress.
"The party who invokes the interference of a court of equity," the Court
stated, "must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct in-
jury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in
some indefinite way in common with people generally." It added that
the taxpayer's interest in the moneys of the national treasury "is shared
with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminate; and
the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so re-
mote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal
to the preventive powers of a court of equity."
supra. Such a rule cannot be based upon any normal application of the doctrines of
equity jurisdiction, and can only be explained upon the basis of the maxim that for
every wrong (including every unconstitutional effort to spend money) there should be
a remedy.
122. Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601, 609 (1879).
123. 253 U. S. 221 (1920).
124. 253 U. S. 233 (1920).
125. Bradford v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291, 295 (1895). And see Millard v. Roberts, 202
U. S. 429, 438 (1906).
126. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24, 31 (1907).




One may grant everything which the opinion says, and still doubt the
soundness of applying a different rule in the case of the nation than in
that of the states. There are, to be sure, more national than state tax-
payers; but there are also more national taxes. That the interest of
the average taxpayer is any more direct or substantial in one case than
the other seems open to question. Whatever may be said of "the pecu-
liar relation of the corporate taxpayer to the corporation, which is not
without some semblance to that subsisting between stockholder and
private corporation,"128 the relation of the taxpayer to the nation is
essentially the same as his relation to the state. Of course it is possible
that the Court intended the rule of the Frothingham case to apply to
both.'29 Although such a construction is quite out of keeping with the
general tendency to expand the scope of judicial supervision over state
activities, it must be borne in mind that in its opinion in Green v. Fra-
zier" ° the Court had indicated a willingness to forego an independent
judgment as to the validity of a state appropriation. 81 If this be so, the
judges had apparently decided that, at least as to the great majority
of appropriations, whether state or federal, the taxpayer should carry
his grievance "to the polls, and not to the courts." But in any case it
indicates that the Court hesistated to become a perpetual censor of the
correctness of congressional interpretations of the scope of the national
spending power.
Under a different system of judicial review such a ruling would have
no such far reaching effect. In Austria 32 any state (Land) can take the
nation (Reich) to court, so that the opposition need only control a single
state government to be assured of easy and direct access to the court of
last resort. But at the same time that the Court decided Frothinghtam
128. Id. at 487. Cf. Note (1924) 37 HAav. L. Rv. 750, 751: "As the object of relief
in all these cases . . . is to protect the citizen from immediately increased taxation due to
the unconstitutional expenditure, it seems doubtful whether any line of demarcation be-
tween state or federal and municipal taxpayers is warranted."
129. This is the interpretation which was apparently adopted in the Note just cited.
Such a construction need not necessarily constitute a reversal of Hawk v. Smith, 253 U.
S. 221 (1920), and Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 (1920), as both were heard on appeal
from state courts. Doubtless a state can liberalize the requirements of equity jurisdiction
and still meet the requirements of the doctrine forbidding federal courts to render ad-
visory opinions, which is equally applicable to appeal from state and federal courts. See
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933). The difficulty is that the
opinion in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923), clearly intimated that to consider
such a person a proper party would do violence to the doctrine.
130. 253 U. S. 233 (1920).
131. But in that case the appropriation had already been sustained by the state court.
Quaere, did the opinion mean to invite such courts, by adopting the rule of Frothingbam v.
Mellon, to free a large part of the spending power of state legislatures from all judicial
supervision?
132. See the references given in note 102, supra.
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v. Mellon it also decided Massachusetts v. Mellon,- s holding that a
state is not a proper party to enjoin a national appropriation. Of course,
normally a state pays no taxes; and we may assume that where it does13
it is to be treated as any other taxpayer and hence comes within the
Frothingharn rule. The contention that the statute constituted an effort
to usurp the reserved powers of the state was treated as merely another
way of stating that it was unconstitutional, and hence not in point in
an effort to prove that the state was a proper party plaintiff.133 Nor
can a state sue on behalf of its citizens, since
"it is no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of
their relations with the federal government. In that field it is the United
States and not the state, which represents them as parens patriae.' 30
At the same time that the Court was refusing to draw limits to the
national spending power, it was also meticulously careful, aside from a
single sentence in an 1896 opinion,13 7 to refrain from any statement
which might have the appearance of a commitment to a broad view of
the scope of that power. Yet the opportunities for taking such a stand
were ample indeed. United States v. Realty Co.,'39 Wilson v. Shaw,
or Frothingham v. MellonW° would have made excellent vehicles for such
a statement, not as obiter dictum, but as the doctrine of the case3ll
In others such a ruling would have lent support to an otherwise somewhat
tenuous conclusion. This is particularly true of Arizona v. California,'2
133. 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
134. See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905); Ohio v. Helvering, 292
U. S. 360 (1934).
135. 262 U. S. 447, 432 (1923). The assertion that such a question "is political and not
judicial in character" may be passed as having been added purely for its decorative effects.
Certainly the Court has not hesitated, when the proper parties were before it, to strike
down a statute because it "invades the reserved rights of the states."
The core of the Austrian theory of "parties in interest" is that when either government
trespasses upon the powers of the other, the latter is a proper party to protest. A simila
doctrine is to be found in Canada. See Cm. Rnv. STAT. (1906) c. 139, § 60; Attorney-
General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion, [1912] A. C. 571.
136. 262 .S. 447, 485-486 (1923).
137. United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U. S. 668 (1896), sustaining the
right of Congress to authorize the taking of the battlefield of Gettyburg by eminent
domain. The conclusion was based largely upon the war power, but the Court aTo
*stated, "Congress has power to declare war, and to create and equip armies and navies.
It has the great power of taxation, to be exercised for the common defense and general
welfare. Having such powers, it has such other and implied ones as are nece zary and
appropriate for the purpose of carrying the powers expressly given into effect."
138. 163 U. S. 429 (1896). 139. 204 U. S. 24 (1907).
140. 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
141. For example, in the last case cited the Court might have adopted the technique
followed in Bradford v. Roberts, and Millard v. Roberts-, both suPra note 125, and held
that, "pas ing the .. . alleged defect of partiesI' the appropriation was a valid one.
142. 283 U. S. 423 (1931). And see Smith v. Kansas City Tile and Trust Co, 255
U. S. 180 (1921), sustaining the Federal Farm Loan Act on the ground that Congres might,
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where the Boulder Canyon Project Act 143 was sustained as an exercise
of Congress' power to regulate navigation. Yet "all others can see and
understand" that power development and the securing of an ample
supply of water for domestic and agricultural uses were the primary
purposes of that act, any benefits to navigation being largely, possibly
even purely, incidental. Indeed, candor forced the Court to concede
that the Colorado River Compact, to the terms of which the act was
expressly made subject, "makes the improvement of navigation sub-
servient to all other purposes." This was stating it somewhat mildly,
as article four (a) of the Compact reads,
"Inasmuch as the Colorado River has ceased to be navigable for com-
merce and the reservation of its waters for navigation would seriously
limit the development of its basin, the use of its waters for purposes of
navigation shall be subservient to the uses of such waters for domestic,
agricultural, and power purposes."
Consequently the ruling was as superficial as it would be to hold that the
vast undertakings of the T.V.A. are merely incidental to a desire to
improve the navigability of the Tennessee River and furnish a source of
nitrates for use in case of war.' Failure on the part of the Court
even to mention the "spending power" would seem to indicate either
that it was unwilling to sanction the construction of such gigantic public
works on this clause, or that for particular reasons peculiar to the case
it could not do so here.'4
As a result of this long continued judicial self-limitation we entered
the most severe depression in our history with no intimation from the
Court as to how far Congress can legitimately go in using the purse in
attacking the problem of the day. Yet when a new administration
decided to outdo even its predecessor in the effort to speed recovery
through spending, the scope of this power became the most important
constitutional issue of the day, although it was, to be sure, temporarily
overshadowed by talk of "executive dictatorship" in contravention of
the "separation of powers" and efforts under the N.I.R.A. to reopen the
question of the scope of the commerce power. At the same time certain
factors made it evident that the Court could not postpone facing the
issue much longer, even if it preferred to do so.
[To be continued]
at some future date, wish to use the banks created under it as federal fiscal agencies. In an
excellent brief filed by Charles E. Hughes, the Court was invited to sustain the act as a
valid exercise of the spending power.
143. 45 STAT. 1057, 43 U. S. C. A. § 617 (1928).
144. Does Ashwander v. T. V. A., 56 Sup. Ct. 66 (1936) foreshadow such a ruling?
This case is discussed infra.
145. Quaere, does the spending power, to the extent that it exceeds the normal powers
of Congress, carry with it the right to ignore the police regulations of a state? See infra.
Arizona law prohibited the construction of a dam without first meeting certain require-
ments which the nation had not undertaken to fulfill.
[Vol. 45
